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IN 1998, FRANKLIN ALIX was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death for a crime that it now appears he did not commit.'
The jury convicted him primarily based on the testimony of a Houston
Police Department ("HPD") crime lab analyst who told jurors that
blood found at the scene contained both Alix's and the victim's
DNA.2 When questions arose about the accuracy of the HPD crime
lab's data in 2003, an independent lab analyst retested the same evi-
dence and determined that the blood found at the scene was not
Alix's. 3 Alix is in the process of seeking exoneration. 4
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This Comment is the third in an occasional series of comments written by law students
who have participated in the University of San Francisco School of Law's Keta Taylor Colby
Death Penalty Project ("KTC Project"). The KTC Project funds, trains, and sends law
students to spend a summer working with capital defense lawyers in the South. See Steven
F. Shatz, The Keta Taylor Colby Death Penalty Project: Prologue, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 747 (2004).
This Comment arises from the author's work as a part of the KTC Project in Texas during
the summer of 2003.
1. Associated Press, DNA Retests Entangle Another Death-Row Case, Dec. 16, 2003, at
http://www.khou.com/crimelab/stories/khou031216_jw-crimelabretests.aa3le67b.html
(last accessed Apr. 2, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Alix's story is one example of a larger problem-the use of faulty
crime lab data to obtain convictions. Like many of the accused in
Houston, Texas, Alix was convicted using erroneous DNA test results
from the HPD crime lab. The HPD crime lab is widely believed to be
one of the nation's most poorly run crime labs. 5 Reports have re-
vealed many deficiencies at the lab, including that biological materials
at the HPD crime lab are sometimes improperly stored, the HPD
crime lab employees are untrained and underqualified, and employ-
ees have misrepresented lab results at trial. 6 The HPD crime lab is also
located in Harris County, which sends more defendants to death row
than any other county in the United States. 7 Although a small number
of defendants convicted based on evidence tested at the HPD crime
lab are in the process of getting new trials, numerous others remain in
prison-some awaiting death-either because lab samples used in
their trials were not properly stored for retesting8 or because the dis-
5. See Adam Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas
Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 ("Legal experts say the laboratory is the
worst in the country, but troubles there are also seen in other crime laboratories.").
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See Roma Khanna, Legislators Urge Audit of HPD Lab: Woes Cited in Call for State
Regulation, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 26, 2003, at A31 [hereinafter Khanna, Legislators Urge Au-
dit]; see also Liptak, supra note 5. As of April 13, 2005, 159 of the 445 inmates currently on
death row in Texas were convicted in Harris County. See TEX. DEP'T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COUNTY OF CONvIriON FOR OFFENDERS ON DEATH Row (2005), at http://
www.tdcj.state.tx.us./stat/countyconviction.htm (last accessed Apr. 24, 2005). A total of
280 offenders have been sentenced to death in Harris County. TEX. DEP'T OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO DEATH FROM EACH COUNTY (2005), at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countysentenced.htm (last accessed Apr. 24, 2005). Eighty
of these offenders have been executed. TEX. DEP'T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COUNTY OF CON-
VICTION FOR EXECUTED OFFENDERS (2005), at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyex-
ecuted.htm (last accessed Apr. 24, 2005).
8. The case of Ronald Cantrell provides one example of where a private laboratory
could not duplicate the results of a DNA test performed by analysts at the HPD crime lab,
raising questions not only about the man's guilt, but also about the way the HPD crime lab
analyzed and stored DNA evidence. SeeJames Kimberly, Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna,
HPD Crime Lab Takes Another Hit; Shoddy Handling, Storing of DNA Raises Doubts About Rape
Conviction, Hous. CHRON., May 10, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Kimberly, McVicker & Khanna,
HPD Crime Lab Takes Another Hit]. In December 2001, Cantrell was charged and pled guilty
to the sexual assault of an eight-year-old, accepting a relatively light six year sentence, be-
cause results from the HPD crime lab indicated Cantrell's semen was on the girl's shirt. See
id.; Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, HPD Begins In-House Investigations of 2 Cases With Ques-
tionable Lab Work, Hous. CHRON., June 13, 2003, at A8. An independent lab retested the
shirt and could not locate any semen on the blouse or any other DNA evidence that would
implicate or exonerate Cantrell. Kimberly, McVicker & Khanna, HPD Crime Lab Takes An-
other Hit, supra. The independent lab then attempted to retest the sample that the HPD
crime lab had used, but it was "so deteriorated that a new test could not implicate Cantrell
either." Id. (quoting the Harris County District Attorney's Office). According to an inde-
pendent forensic expert, properly dried DNA samples should last more than a year. Id. The
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trict attorney did not order retesting.9 These defendants may have
been unfairly convicted because they were not able to fully test the
evidence that the prosecution used against them.
The deficiencies at the HPD crime lab are not unique. Problems
have been reported at crime labs in seventeen states. 10 In two of the
most egregious cases, lab chemists in West Virginia and Oklahoma
City were accused of falsifying testimony in hundreds of cases.'1 These
cases are still being reviewed; so far ten defendants have been exoner-
ated.12 Indeed, it is not just state crime labs that have been implicated.
The integrity of the FBI crime lab has also been called into question.' 3
In the mid-1990s an FBI whistleblower revealed that evidence had
been handled improperly, leading to the firing of several lab offi-
cials. 14 More recently, in May 2004, FBI analystJacqueline Blake plead
guilty to a misdemeanor charge of making false statements about fol-
lowing protocol in 100 DNA reports. 15 Again, the integrity of convic-
tions obtained using data from these crime labs is questionable.
Nevertheless, a remedy exists for defendants who have been con-
victed using evidence from deficient crime labs. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "[n]o
State... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
Brady claim asserted in this Comment is essential to cases where restesting of evidence
proves inconclusive. Although proving innocence through retesting in these cases is diffi-
cult, defendants who took their cases before ajury still deserve a remedy because their first
trial was unfair as they were unable to fully test the crime lab evidence used against them.
9. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
10. See Maurice Possley, Steve Mills & Flynn McRoberts, Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs;
FPawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., Cut. Tam., Oct. 21, 2004, at C1.
11. Id.
12. Id. Similar problems have been reported at other state crime labs. In Arizona,
police crime lab technicians used erroneous DNA calculations in nine cases, including a
homicide that resulted in a conviction and lead to two other investigations in which sus-
pects pled guilty. See Robert Tanner, Stained by a Shadow of Doubt; Although Only a Few Convic-
tions Have Been Overturned Because of Errors, Critics Want Facilities to be Accredited, L.A. TIMES,
July 13, 2003, at Al. Furthermore, in Montana, a state crime lab examiner, Arnold
Melnikoff, gave erroneous testimony about hair comparisons that contributed to three
wrongful convictions. See Possley, Mills, & McRoberts, supra note 10. The problems at state
crime labs do not just involve the presentation of false testimony at trial. In Maryland, a
police chemist resigned after admitting that she did not understand the basic blood typing
science involved in her work; the analyst handled about 480 cases, but the police decided
not to review them. Id. Moreover, in Kansas, a man was released from custody because a
blood sample was mislabeled. See Tanner, supra. He has now been charged in a string of
rapes and a 2002 murder. Id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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process of law."' 6 In Brady v. Mayland,17 the United States Supreme
Court held that a due process violation occurs when prosecutors fail
to disclose material evidence that will exculpate the defendant or im-
peach testimony.' 8 Inadequate lab conditions, such as lack of techni-
cian training and improper storage of biological materials, constitute
material evidence in cases where crime lab data is introduced to prove
the defendant's guilt. Without knowledge of these problems, the de-
fense cannot fully test the prosecution's case. In these cases, therefore,
a prosecutor's failure to disclose systemic crime lab errors to the de-
fense compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial in violation of
due process. Under Brady, these defendants are entitled to a new trial.
This Comment demonstrates how Brady provides a due process
remedy for those defendants convicted using evidence from faulty
crime labs. While problems exist at many crime labs, this Comment
focuses on the problems at the HPD crime lab as a case study because
experts have characterized it as "the worst in the country" and because
the consequences in Harris County are often severe. 19 This applica-
tion of Brady is, however, valid for any case nationwide where the pros-
ecution failed to disclose material evidence of problems at a
government-run crime lab to the defense team before trial.
Part I of this Comment describes the problems discovered at the
HPD crime lab. Part II discusses the legal requirements a defendant
must show in order to claim a due process violation under Brady. Part
III applies the facts of the HPD crime lab to Brady law in order to
illustrate the legal remedy for convicted defendants who were prose-
cuted with evidence obtained from the HPD crime lab that was mate-
rial to their conviction. This Comment concludes that if a prosecutor
uses evidence from a problematic crime lab to obtain a conviction and
fails to disclose the crime lab's problems to the defense, the Constitu-
tion demands that the defendant receive a new trial-a fair trial.
I. Behind the Doors of the HPD Crime Lab
After local news reporters raised questions about the HPD crime
lab's procedures and results in 2002, the Department of Public Safety
("DPS") decided to investigate the lab. 20 Its audit of the lab exposed
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18. Id. at 86.
19. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
20. See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs; Legislators
Look at Oversight Panel, Regional Facilities, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2005, at BI [hereinafter
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deficiencies in procedure, training, and interpretation and documen-
tation of results at the lab. Indeed, the lab received failing grades in
practically every category in which it was evaluated.21 The report de-
tailed a range of lapses, including that evidence had potentially been
contaminated and that vital equipment had not been calibrated.
22
Moreover, auditors noted that lab technicians had a tendency to "use
up evidence," making it impossible to retest.23 These errors call into
question the validity of all testing conducted at the lab.
The HPD's response to the media reports illustrates the gravity of
the problems at the crime lab. After the first reports of mismanage-
ment in December 2002, the police department shut down the DNA
division of the lab.24 In January 2003, the district attorney's office or-
dered retesting of approximately 380 samples of DNA evidence used
to obtain criminal convictions.25 Subsequently, irregularities were dis-
covered in other lab divisions; the police department temporarily
closed the toxicology division in October 2003 because the supervisor
failed a competency test, placing thousands of DWI and narcotics
cases in jeopardy.26 Houston Police Chief C.O. Bradford admitted that
he had known about the poor lab conditions for years.27 In June 2003,
after documents showed that analysts had also complained to him
about the lab conditions several years earlier, he announced plans to
retire. 28 After internal investigators uncovered evidence from approxi-
Khanna & McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs]; Anna Werner, HPD Crime Lab Audit
Uncovers a Range of Problems, Jan 22, 2003, at http://www.khou.com/topstories/stories/
khou03Ol22 mh-HPDcrimelabaudit.4b993918.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2004) (on file
with U.S.F. Law Review) [hereinafter Werner, HPD Crime Lab Audit].
21. See Werner, HPD Crime Lab Audit, supra note 20.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Independent Review Sought for HPD Lab; Chief
Makes Call After the Discovey of More Case Files, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at Al [hereinaf-
ter McVicker & Khanna, Independent Review Sought]. The DNA division remains closed. See
Steve McVicker, Regional Crime Lab Measure Is DOA; House Member Says Last-Minute Demands
by Hurtt Killed His Bill Hous. CHRON., Apr. 17, 2005, at B1. The HPD contracted with
Identigene, a private laboratory in Houston, to perform new DNA. Kimberly, McVicker &
Khanna, HPD Crime Lab Takes Another Hit, supra note 8. The current director of the HPD
crime lab, Irma Rios, expects it to reopen in December 2005. See id.
25. See McVicker & Khanna, Independent Review Sought, supra note 24. The HPD origi-
nally sent more than 1,300 cases to the district attorney for review and possible retesting.
Id.
26. Id. The toxicology division partially reopened in February 2004. Id.
27. See Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Police Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab; Two Officials
Quit, Others Disciplined, Hous. CHRON., June 17, 2003, at Al [hereinafter McVicker &
Khanna, Police Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab].
28. See McVicker & Khanna, Independent Review Sought, supra note 24.
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mately 8,000 cases that was improperly tagged and stored, as well as
fourteen more case files that needed to be reviewed for possible retest-
ing, the new police chief, Harold Hurtt, suspended the internal inves-
tigation and called for a probe by independent investigators. 29
Additionally, Hurtt ordered another comprehensive review of DNA
division cases that might require retesting and, along with state sena-
tors Rodney Ellis and John Witmore, called for a moratorium on ex-
ecutions in Harris County until the misplaced evidence had been
catalogued. 30 The Texas Legislature is also considering a number of
proposed crime lab reforms because of the controversy.3'
What exactly did the audits by forensic examiners reveal about
the HPD crime lab that led to these actions? Audits have shown that
employees both at the management and analyst levels made funda-
mental mistakes. The types of problems affecting the validity of the
physical testing in the HPD crime lab can be divided into three cate-
gories: (1) poor storage of evidence, (2) a lack of standards for lab
employees, and (3) criminalists' misrepresentations.
A. Improper Storage of Biological Materials
Evidence storage problems at the HPD crime lab included a leaky
roof and mislabeled boxes of evidence. 32 A former criminalist and
DNA analyst at the lab described the leaky roof's condition and the
problems it caused in her resignation letter:
"[The] leaking of water has forced the employees on the 26th floor
(of HPD headquarters) to work in hazardous conditions. These
hazardous conditions include uncontainable puddles of water,
water leaking . . . onto biological materials such as blood-soaked
items. This water containment problem has at times, in my opin-
29. See Roma Khanna, HPD Errors Spark New Review of DNA Cases; DA Considering
Charges For Some Crime Lab Analysts, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2004, at Al [hereinafter
Khanna, HPD Errors Spark New Review of DNA Cases]; McVicker & Khanna, Independent Review
Sought, supra note 24. Nevertheless, the Houston Chronicle noted in February 2005 that the
independent probe had not yet begun. See Khanna & McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime
Labs, supra note 20.
30. See Khanna, HPD Errors Spark New Review of DNA Cases, supra note 29; Khanna &
McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs, supra note 20. Harris County District Attorney,
Chuck Rosenthal, did not support the moratorium on executions. See Roma Khanna,
Lawmakers Address Crime Lab Problems: Committee Looks at Reforms, Says Local Officials Have
Dragged Their Feet, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Khanna, Lawmakers Ad-
dress Crime Lab Problems].
31. See Khanna, Lawmakers Address Crime Lab Problems, supra note 30; Khanna & Mc-
Vicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs, supra note 20.
32. See Liptak, supra note 5; Khanna, HPD Errors Spark New Review of DNA Cases, supra
note 29.
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ion, compromised the integrity of biological evidence stored in our
facility." 33
When City Councilwoman Carol Alvarado toured the facility on
June 11, 2002, she was surprised by the conditions.3 4 She admitted to
reporters that she failed to appreciate the problem when lab employ-
ees first reported to her that the lab had a leaky roof, but the gravity of
the problem became apparent when she saw that there "were holes in
the ceiling right over or near evidence" as well as in the "analysis
area."3 5 A team of forensic scientists who audited the lab described the
serious impact of the leakage problem.3 6 They noted that it can cause
contamination or deleterious change to evidence, or both.3 7 Moreo-
ver, water can cause cross-contamination of samples or the loss of
DNA, which degrades quickly when wet.38 The leaky roof, therefore,
calls into question the reliability of all tests that were conducted on
evidence in this part of the lab.
Furthermore, evidence dating back more than two decades was
improperly tagged and lost in the HPD's property room.3 9 In August
2003, the 280 mislabeled boxes containing this evidence were discov-
ered, but they sat unopened for almost a year.40 The boxes, many of
them splitting apart, currently fill an entire room on the HPD's
twenty-fourth floor.4 1 Investigators opened the boxes in August 2004
and found evidence from approximately 8,000 cases dating from 1979
to 1991.42 The evidence contained in the boxes "ranged from a fetus
and human body parts to clothes and a bag of Cheetos." 4 3 The full
implications of this evidence are currently unclear-when the boxes
were discovered officials had no idea whether the evidence belonged
to open or closed cases or whether it had ever been tested. 44 The evi-
33. Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Mayor Knew of Lab Woes, Others Contradict Brown's
Benign Assessment, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2003, at 21A (quoting Letter of Resignation from
Jennifer LaCross, Criminalist and DNA Analyst, Houston Police Department, to Assistant
Chief M.C. Simmons, Captain R.W. Robertson; Donald R. Krueger, and James R. Bolding,
Houston Police Department (May 28, 2002)).
34. See id.
35. Id. (quoting Houston City Councilperson Carol Alvarado).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Roma Khanna, New Evidence Furor Hits HPD; Mislabeled Boxes May Be Final Straw
for Full-Scale Probe, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
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dence could affect cases of convicted defendants who are permitted to
seek DNA testing under state law and, while Assistant District Attorney
Roe Wilson stated she was not aware of any cases where missing evi-
dence was a problem, she said that she could not rule out that this
issue will arise.45 To address the real possibility that some of the dis-
covered evidence has never been examined or used at trial, HPD per-
sonnel have been working two shifts a day, seven days a week since
August 2004 to catalog the evidence, a process which is estimated will
take a year to complete.
46
Problems like these at the HPD crime lab are not a new revela-
tion. Rather, as far back as 1999, lab employees complained to the
Chief of Police about the lab conditions, saying parts of the lab were a
"total disaster" and that "an overwhelming build-up of DNA cases" re-
sulted from criminalists' lack of DNA analysis skills.47 In March 2003,
Police Chief C.O. Bradford told the Houston Chronicle that he had
known that the roof over the crime lab leaked for more than five
years, adding that "'there is always a concern about evidence contami-
nation when you have a structural problem.' ,,48 The HPD confirmed
this in a press release, admitting that, among other things, there were
problems with the facilities and evidence control.49
Evidence of a leaky roof and improperly stored evidence in and
of itself would seem fodder for impeachment in any case in which
crime lab evidence was introduced, yet the Houston District Attorney
never revealed these problems to defense attorneys. Moreover, these
problemis at the HPD crime lab were just the beginning.
B. Lack of Structure and Oversight
After the DNA division closed in December 2002, audits revealed
a variety of problems related to the educational qualifications and
training of lab employees, both at the management and the analyst
levels. Other revelations have shown that lab employees sometimes
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Anna Werner, When Did Bradford Know of Crime Lab Problems: Investigating Evi-
dence of Errors in the Lab, (June 19, 2003), at http://www.khou.com/news/defenders/inves-
tigate/stories/khou030619 dsCrimeLabPoliceChief.bc2a754.html (last accessed Apr. 12,
2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
48. McVicker & Khanna, Police Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab, supra note 27 (quoting the
statement of Bradford's spokesperson to the Houston Chronicle).
49. See News Release, Houston Police Department, Discipline in HPD Crime Lab In-
vestigation (June 12, 2003) (available upon- request through HPD Media Relations,
hpdmedia@cityofhouston.net) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
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utilize questionable methods. The lack of structure and oversight at
the HPD crime lab has led to known errors in a number of cases.
The HPD crime lab did not hold potential employees to rigorous
standards or subject current employees to regular evaluation. Based
on national standards and a Houston Chronicle review of personnel
files, none of the analysts working in the DNA division of the HPD
crime lab were qualified by education or training to do their jobs.5 0
The DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards51 require em-
ployees to take statistics, genetics, biochemistry, and molecular biol-
ogy or to be formally trained to meet those standards. 52 According to
the Houston Chronicle survey, of the eleven employees in the lab's DNA
division, only one of the analysts had completed all of the required
college courses.53 Furthermore, none of them had been formally
trained to meet those standards.54
Moreover, the lab did not always comply with its own minimal
standards. Forjobs in the DNA section, the city required only a bache-
lor's degree in biology, molecular biology, biochemistry, genetics, or a
50. See Lise Olsen & Roma Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified: Review Finds Educa-
tion, Training Lacking, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2003, at Al [hereinafter DNA Lab Analysts
Unqualified]. At the time the problems at the lab surfaced, it was not accredited by the
American Society of Crime Lab Directors/ Laboratory Accreditation Board ("ASCLD/
LAB"). See Peggy O'Hare, HPD to Review Crime Lab's Work; Investigation by Channel 11 Ques-
tioned Whether Errors Led to Jailing of Innocent, Hous. CHRON. Nov. 16, 2002, at A35. The
ASCLD/LAB is a voluntary program in which any crime lab may participate to demonstrate
that its management, operations, personnel procedures, equipment, physical plant, secur-
ity, and personnel safety procedures meet established standards. See AM. Soc'v OF CRIME
LAB. DIRS., ACCREDITATION (2003), available at http://www.ascld.org/accreditation.html
(last accessed May 16, 2005). There are approximately 600 crime labs across the country; as
of March 2004, less then half of them were accredited. See AM. Soc'v OF CRIME LAB. Dins./
LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., HISTORY (2004), available at http://www.ascld-lab.org/dual/as-
labdualhistory.html (last accessed May 16, 2005); O'Hare, supra. Houston's lab is currently
in the process of obtaining accreditation. See More DPS Labs Flawed; DNA Testing Woes Across
State Threaten Thousands of Cases, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2004, at Al. The fact that many
crime labs across the United States are not accredited demonstrates the gravity of the prob-
lem-a lack of standards creates more room for error.
51. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation established the DNA Advisory
Board under the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131-14134 (2000), as a
separate and distinct advisory board administered by the FBI. See ARTHUR EISENBERG, DNA
ADVISORY BOARD UPDATE, available at http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/us-
symplOproc/content/04Eisenberg.pdf (last accessed May 5, 2005). The Director of the
FBI, in accordance with the DNA Identification Act of 1994, specified that the Board may
develop, revise, and recommend standards for quality assurance, including standards for
testing the proficiency of forensic laboratories, and forensic analysts in conducting analysis
of DNA. Id.
52. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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"related field"; no experience was necessary.55 Jobs, however, were
given to graduates with other, questionably related science degrees
such as chemistry and zoology.5 6 For instance, those hired to perform
DNA testing included two workers from the city zoo, including one
who most recently had been cleaning elephant's cages and had a de-
gree in zoology.5 7
Also among the staff were some individuals who had flunked ba-
sic science classes in college, although they eventually earned their
degrees. 58 While these individuals may have technically met the pre-
requisites to work at the lab, their competency was questionable in
light of their academic achievements. Compounding this problem was
that the lab lacked formal on-the-job training and evaluation. 59 While
the lab possessed an informal peer-mentoring program, it was un-
documented and analysts were not regularly tested to ensure that they
had mastered the skills learned from their colleagues.
60
The case of Josiah Sutton demonstrates the disturbing outcome
that may result when crime lab employees do not meet minimum edu-
cational standards and receive no formal training. According to the
transcript in her file, Christy Kim, a long-term DNA analyst who
started work as a criminalist at the HPD crime lab in 1989, never took
statistics. 6 1 An understanding of statistics is vital to interpreting and
explaining the significance of DNA tests.6 2 Consequently, statistical er-
rors have been found in evidence that Kim analyzed for three cases,
including teenager Josiah Sutton's rape trial in which her statistical
errors had major consequences. 63
During Sutton's 1999 trial, prosecutors had little evidence-the
victim was the only eyewitness and her recollection was faulty. 64 Kim,
however, testified at trial that she detected Sutton's DNA pattern in
the rape kit.65 Moreover, her report stated that this pattern was only
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Liptak, supra note 5.
65. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50; Anna Werner,
HPD Crime Lab May Have Sent an Innocent Teen to Prison, (Jan. 30, 2003), at http://
www.khou.com/news/local/stories/khou03Ol30_mh-hpdlabsutton.7c36b06.html (last ac-
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found in one out of 694,000 African-Americans. 66 The jury convicted
Sutton of rape and sentenced him to twenty-five years in state
prison.67 The state appellate court noted at trial that Sutton was "con-
victed in large part on the results of a DNA test."68 Unfortunately, Kim
had improperly analyzed a semen sample that would have excluded
Sutton as one of the two rapists and then badly miscalculated the odds
that his DNA could have matched the sample by mere chance. 69 Sut-
ton served four years of his twenty-five year sentence before a recent
DNA retest from an independent lab exonerated him.70 He has now
been released from prison and pardoned.71 DNA expert William
Thompson examined the HPD crime lab's test work and concluded
that if police had taken any two black men off of the street the chance
of one of them having the DNA pattern that could be found in the
rape samples of Sutton's case was not one in 694,000, as Kim testified,
but actually one in eight.72 Sutton's case is but one example of the
unfairness that may result when crime lab employees charged with
testing sensitive DNA evidence are not qualified. Had Kim's question-
able qualifications been disclosed to Sutton's defense team, it would
have provided important impeachment evidence that could have been
used to attack Kim's testimony at trial.
Many of the problems at the analyst level of the DNA division may
have stemmed from poor direction and oversight by management
level employees. For example, independent auditors from the DPS
found that James Bolding, the founder and former head of the DNA
division, was not qualified to be a supervisor, nor was he even quali-
fied to be an accredited DNA analyst.73 Like Kim, he had not taken
courses in statistics-education that, as demonstrated by Josiah Sut-
ton's case, is essential to understanding DNA results.74 Moreover, al-
though Bolding possessed both a bachelor's degree and a master's
cessed Apr. 12, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review) [hereinafter Werner, Innocent Teen to
Prison].
66. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50; Werner, Innocent
Teen to Prison, supra note 65.
67. Liptak, supra note 5.
68. Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951, 2001 WL 40349, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18,
2001).
69. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50.
70. See Liptak, supra note 5; Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note
50.
71. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50.
72. See Werner, Innocent Teen to Prison, supra note 65.
73. See Olsen & Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified, supra note 50.
74. See id. Bolding responded to the audit by stating that he had attended a statistics
seminar through a forensic science group that he thought satisfied the requirement. Id.
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degree in biology from Texas Southern University, he was academi-
cally dismissed from a University of Texas Ph.D. program. 75
Even more problematic than Bolding's academic shortcomings
was the lack of structure he provided to the DNA division of the lab.
An investigation by the Internal Affairs Division found that Bolding
had generally failed to provide adequate oversight to the operations
of the DNA section of the crime lab. 76 Among other violations, Bold-
ing failed to ensure that employees assigned to conduct DNA analysis
attended training courses, failed to require compliance with FBI
guidelines governing the operation of the Combined DNA Indexing
System, and failed to mandate that the DNA section of the crime lab
had a viable case management system after being notified in 1996 and
1997 that the lab had no such system.77 Furthermore, he failed to con-
duct annual inspections of the DNA section of the crime lab and
failed to ensure that damaged evidence from thirty-four sexual assault
and homicide cases was properly documented. 78 This lack of organiza-
tion and oversight at the lab jeopardizes the integrity of all evidence
tested at the lab because a lack of uniform standards leads to question-
able results.
Similar to the DNA division, the ballistics division of the crime lab
employed individuals who utilized questionable methodology and per-
haps lacked proper training. The work of Robert Baldwin, the current
ballistics lab chief, is at issue in two capital murder cases. 79 Baldwin
testified at Nanon Williams's trial that the victim of a 1992 shooting
during a drug deal was shot in the head with a .25-caliber bullet-the
caliber of Williams's gun.80 Williams was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death.81 Six years later, Baldwin retracted his first statement,
and concluded that, upon review, it was clear that a .22-caliber bullet
killed the victim. 82 William's co-defendant had carried a .22-caliber
75. Id.
76. See News Release, Houston Police Department, supra note 49. After the LAD com-
pleted its investigation, several committees reviewed the investigation's findings and rec-
ommended that Bolding be terminated. See id. Bolding was placed on indefinite
suspension instead and submitted his retirement paperwork on June 11, 2003. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Steve McVicker, Ballistics Lab Results Questioned in Three Cases: Judicial Rulings
Raise Concerns Death Sentences May Rest on Faulty Police Analysis, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 14,
2005, at Al [hereinafter McVicker, Ballistics Lab Results Questioned in Three Cases].
80. Id.
81. See Khanna, Legislators Urge Audit, supra note 7.
82. See McVicker, Ballistics Lab Results Questioned in Three Cases, supra note 79.
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gun, but it was never tested.83 Although a state district judge recom-
mended a new trial for Williams based on this evidence, the state
court of criminal appeals rejected that idea.84 Williams's appeal is now
pending in federal court.8 5 Baldwin's clear error the first time he per-
formed testing and his complete failure to even test the co-defen-
dant's gun suggests that he lacked proper training in ballistics and
that there are insufficient safeguards in place at the HPD crime lab to
ensure that employees perform accurate tests.
Baldwin also testified atJohnnie Bernal's capital murder trial that
the fatal bullet came from Bernal's gun.86 When conducting tests,
however, Baldwin had to fire the gun twenty-five times and clean the
barrel with solvent before he got a ballistics "match."87 Several fire-
arms experts have told the Houston Chronicle that most ballistics tests
require no more than three shots.88 Bernal currently waits on death
row as his appeal is pending in federal court. 89 Baldwin's questionable
methodology constituted impeachment evidence that would have
called into question his important. testimony linking Williams and
Bernal to the murder weapons in these two cases.
If defense attorneys had been aware that HPD crime lab employ-
ees who testified in their clients' trials lacked essential qualifications
and that the lab was not structured in a way to ensure the integrity of
test results, they could have used this information to persuade jurors
that seemingly sound scientific conclusions were, in fact, quite fallible.
C. Misrepresentations that Support the Prosecution's Case
At best, employees at the HPD crime lab were unqualified and
poorly managed. At worst, they misrepresented information at trial in
order to strengthen the prosecution's case. There are several known
instances where HPD crime lab employees appear to have lied in
court. This may indicate a pattern of perjury.
For example, at Frank Fanniel's aggravated robbery trial, HPD
crime lab analyst Joseph Chu's testimony was crucial. 90 Fanniel was
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Steve McVicker, Crime Lab 's Standards Called "Figment": Convict's Lawyer Questions
Truth Past Testimony, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter McVicker, Crime Lab's
Standards Called "Figment"].
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arrested while attempting to sell items stolen in a robbery and police
found a stocking mask in the trunk of his car.91 Chu's analysis of saliva
found on the mask linked Fanniel to the crime; without the DNA evi-
dence there would have been a strong case for possession of stolen
property, but not aggravated robbery.92 At trial, Chu testified that test-
ing performed at the DNA division of the HPD crime lab was relia-
ble. 93 He told jurors, "'Our laboratory is following the guidelines of
the FBI' . . . . 'Every time the FBI has new rules of what the DNA
laboratory has to do to perform DNA analysis, our laboratory follows
their guidelines and achieves their goals.' 94 He did not, however,
state to the jury or the district attorney that seven months earlier he
and five other DNA analysts had written to Police Chief Bradford vent-
ing their frustration about the conditions that they feared were jeop-
ardizing the quality of their evidence processing.95 Nor did he reveal
that they had complained to Bradford that the lab was a "'total disas-
ter"' and that it did not comply with national forensic guidelines.96
Fanniel was convicted and sentenced to twenty-two years in prison.97
Lower-level analysts were not the only employees who exagger-
ated the quality of tests performed at the HPD crime lab. In June
2004, State District Judge Jan Krocker ruled that there was probable
cause to believe Bolding had committed aggravated perjury during
the 2002 trial of Wilbur Grimes, who was convicted of sexual assault.98
According to court transcripts, Bolding testified that he had obtained
a doctorate in biochemistry from the University of Texas.99 When con-
fronted about this testimony in May 2004, Bolding admitted that he
did not possess a doctorate.100 He later told reporters that the court
reporter must have made an error in the transcript. 101 The perjury
case was dropped, however, when the judge determined that the stat-
ute of limitations had run. 10 2
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Steve McVicker, Ex-crime Lab Leader Again Under Scrutiny: New Hearing Could
Lead to Larger Probe, Hous. CHRON., May 25, 2004, at All [hereinafter McVicker, Ex-Crime
Lab Leader]; Steve McVicker, Crime Lab's Standards Called "Figment", supra note 90.
99. McVicker, Ex-Crime Lab Leader, supra note 98.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See McVicker, Crime Lab's Standards Called "Figment", supra note 90.
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Even more suspect, Bolding interpreted identical scientific evi-
dence of blood type configuration from two rape cases, occurring
within a six year period, in conflicting ways.103 In each case he offered
testimony that bolstered the prosecution's theory of the case. 10 4 In the
first case, George Rodriguez was convicted of rape based partly on
Bolding's erroneous testimony that excluded another suspect as the
perpetrator. 05 In seeking to convict Rodriguez, the police depart-
ment chose not to prosecute another suspect, Isidro Yanez, despite
evidence that implicated his involvement with the crime and sug-
gested he had a history of sexual assault. 10 6 Although the victim had
picked Rodriguez out of a lineup, other evidence showed that Yanez
and Rodriguez looked alike, that the victim had also picked Yanez out
of a photo spread, that the co-defendant had implicated Yanez, and
that Rodriguez was at work during the time of the assault.'0 7 The de-
fense argued at trial that Yanez committed the crime.10 8 Nevertheless,
when DNA Division Chief Bolding took the stand, he told jurors that
it would be scientifically impossible for Yanez to have committed the
crime because Yanez's blood type did not match that type found on
the victim. 10 9 Rodriguez was sentenced to sixty years in prison. 110
Six years after Rodriguez was convicted, however, Bolding came
to the opposite conclusion under identical serological circumstances,
testifying in a different case that defendant Abe McFarland could not
be excluded as a contributor to biological samples from another rape
because of his blood type."' The blood-type combination in this sce-
nario was identical to that in the Rodriguez case. 112 After the Houston
Chronicle detailed the two cases for her, forensic expert and HPD
crime lab critic LibbyJohnson confirmed that the two cases presented
identical situations and, therefore, "'there [wa]s nothing that should
have made [Bolding] testify differently' ..... 'He should have testified
103. See Roma Khanna, HPD's Troubled Crime Lab: Similar Evidence, Different Opinions in
Two Rape Cases; Supervisor's Inconsistent Takes Raise Doubts About His Testimony, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 29, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Khanna, HPD's Troubled Crime Lab].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Steve McVicker, DNA Not Only Problem in Man's Rape Conviction; Review of Police
Procedures Casts More Doubt in Case, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 22, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Mc-
Vicker, DNA Not Only Problem].
107. Id.
108. See Khanna, HPD's Troubled Crime Lab, supra note 103.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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in both cases that he would not have been able to exclude either sus-
pect."'113 Forensic experts have suggested that this may point to a pat-
tern of scientists from the HPD crime lab manipulating their findings
to fit prosecutors' theories of various crimes. 114
Moreover, in 2004, at the request of the Innocence Project1 15 six
forensic experts reviewed the evidence against Rodriguez. 116 They
found that Bolding was wrong to exclude Yanez and, in a report,
called his conclusions "'completely contrary to generally accepted sci-
entific principles.' 1"117 They also stated that Bolding's statements re-
vealed that either he "'lacked a fundamental understanding of the
most basic principles of blood typing analysis or he knowingly gave
false testimony to support the State's case against George
Rodriguez.' -
New independent DNA retests of a hair found in the victim's
panties, a key piece of evidence in the case, actually exclude George
Rodriguez as a contributor-seventeen years after he entered
prison." 9 "'I've lost everything,"' Rodriguez said, "'I got accused of a
crime and I didn't know nothing [sic] about it.' "120 Had the defense
been aware of a possible pattern of misrepresentations and inconsis-
tent testimony, Bolding's inaccurate statements could have been im-
peached, and perhaps the outcome of Rodriguez's trial would have
been different.
The problems at the HPD crime lab range from poor storage to
inadequate qualifications to possible misrepresentation of evidence.
The stories of Josiah Sutton, who served four years in prison for rape
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The Innocence Project is a non-profit legal clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law that handles cases in which post-conviction DNA testing of evidence can
yield conclusive proof of innocence. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, ABOUT THIS INNOCENCE PRO-
JECT (2001), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/index.php (last accessed
May 6, 2005).
116. See McVicker, DNA Not Only Problem, supra note 106.
117. Roma Khanna, More Tests Sought in 1987 Rape Case; Lawyers Debate the Legitimacy of
Current Results From a DNA Lab, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 31, 2004, at BI [hereinafter Khanna,
More Tests Sought] (quoting the report provided by forensic experts to the Innocence
Project).
118. Khanna, HPD's Troubled Crime Lab, supra note 103 (quoting the report of forensic
scientists submitted with Rodriguez's motion to vacate his sentence).
119. See Khanna, More Tests Sought, supa note 117. While Rodriguez was released from
prison in October 2004, the State is still unwilling to fully exonerate him. See Rosanna Ruiz,
He's No Longer in Prison but Says, "I'm Still Not Free" HPD Crime Lab Errors Might Have Affected
his Case, but That Hasn't Cleared His Name, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2005, at Al.
120. McVicker, DNA Not Only Problem, supra note 106 (quoting George Rodriguez).
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before he was exonerated, and George Rodriguez, who has served sev-
enteen years for a rape he likely did not commit, illustrate the conse-
quences of using faulty scientific evidence tested at the HPD crime lab
to convict when defendants are not made aware of the problems that
surround the evidence until long after their trials.
Although a few defendants have been released or granted new
trials as a result of the revelations, the majority of cases from the lab
will not undergo retesting. For example, the police department sent
the district attorney a list of 1,322 cases to review for possible retest-
ing.121 Nevertheless, the district attorney ultimately decided to retest
only 379 of these cases. 122 The ramifications of failing to submit all
cases for retesting are disconcerting. The results from those cases sub-
mitted for retesting are telling. In February 2005, the Houston Chronicle
summarized the results in 288 retested cases. 123 It found that the pri-
vate lab retests were unable to replicate the HPD crime lab's results in
twenty-five cases, revealed statistical inaccuracies in the HPD crime
lab's results in twelve cases, and wholly contradicted the HPD crime
lab's work in two cases; thirty-one cases required further testing to de-
termine whether results were consistent with HPD crime lab
findings.' 24
What about the other 1,000 cases on the HPD's list that were not
selected for retesting? What about the 8,000 cases for which evidence
was found in mislabeled boxes in the HPD crime lab? Although a few
isolated people have been exonerated, there are thousands of others
whose trials may have been tainted by evidence that was not properly
handled or tested. Regardless of the guilt or innocence of these de-
fendants, the issue is the same-in every case in which evidence tested
at the HPD crime lab was material to a defendant's conviction, the
defendant did not receive a fair trial. These individuals are entitled to
a due process remedy under the law so that they have the opportunity
to fully test the evidence used by the prosecution to convict them.
Brady provides them a solution.' 25
121. See McVicker & Khanna, Independent Review Sought, supra note 24.
122. Id. The district attorney has also admitted that he was concerned that the HPD's
original list of 1,300 cases may not have been comprehensive. See Khanna, HPD Errors Spark
New Review of DNA Cases, supra note 29.
123. See Khanna & McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs, supra note 20.
124. Id.
125. It is worth noting, moreover, that even in those cases where retesting has con-
firmed the HPD crime lab's original analysis, the defendant still has a due process claim,
because a test long after a trial is over cannot retroactively make the trial fair. As such, the
defendant is still entitled to a new trial at which the prosecution's new test may be chal-
lenged. See discussion infra Part II.
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II. The Development of the Brady Claim
United States Supreme Court Justice Douglas reasoned in the
1963 landmark case Brady v. Maryland, "Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated un-
fairly."' 26 In Brady, the Supreme Court examined whether the due
process rights of defendants are violated where the prosecution fails
to turn over material evidence to defense attorneys. 127 In the
landmark ruling, the Supreme Court held that a due process violation
occurs when the prosecution fails to disclose to the defense exculpa-
tory evidence that is "favorable to the accused" and material to guilt or
to punishment. 128 Such disclosure, the Court reasoned, is essential to
a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.' 29
This section first considers the precedent upon which the Su-
preme Court based its important decision in Brady. It then examines
Brady and its progeny. This discussion provides the background neces-
sary to understand why a due process violation occurs when the prose-
cution fails to disclose crime lab deficiencies to the defense prior to
trial, preventing defendants from effectively impeaching the testi-
mony of crime lab employees at trial.
A. The Prosecutor's Role in Ensuring a Defendant's Right to a
Fair Trial
The Supreme Court's seminal decision in Brady was derived from
a number of earlier decisions that also considered the American pros-
ecutors' legal obligations under the due process clause and their "spe-
cial role . . . in the search for truth in criminal trials."' 30
These early cases focused on the use of perjured testimony at
trial. In Mooney v. Holohan131 the Court considered whether the prose-
cution's knowing use of perjured testimony during trial, and its delib-
erate suppression of evidence that would have impeached that
testimony, violated the defendant's due process rights. 132 The Court
rejected the Attorney General's narrow view that an act or omission of
the prosecution only violates due process if it operates to deprive the
126. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
131. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
132. Id. at 110.
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defendant of notice or the opportunity to present evidence in his pos-
session. 133 Rather, the Court stressed the importance of the due pro-
cess requirement "in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against
deprivation through the action of the State" and declared that the
requirement "embodies the fundamental conceptions ofjustice which
lie at the base of [the United States's] civil and political institu-
tions."134 On the basis of this underlying tenet, the Court held that
mere notice and hearing could not satisfy due process when the State
"contrive [s]" a conviction through a deliberate deception of the court
and jury through use of perjured testimony. 135 The Court reasoned
that this type of "contrivance" was as "inconsistent with the rudimen-
tary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimida-
tion.1 36 Mooney thus imposed a duty on the prosecution to refrain
from offering perjured testimony at trial.
The Court subsequently reiterated and expanded this duty. In
Pyle v. Kansas137 the Court again considered allegations that the State
had knowingly solicited and used perjured testimony to obtain the
accused's conviction and had also deliberately suppressed evidence
favorable to him.13 8 It held that these allegations sufficiently charged
a deprivation of due process that if proven would entitle the defen-
dant to release from his present custody. 139 Next, in Napue v. Illi-
nois,140 the Court went a step further and considered whether it was a
violation of due process for the prosecution to allow perjured testi-
mony to go uncorrected. 4 1 In Napue, the State's witness lied by stating
that he had not received any promise of consideration in exchange
for testifying. 142 Although the prosecutor did not solicit this false testi-
mony, the Court nevertheless held that the prosecution's failure to
correct it violated due process.143 The Court also recognized that it
was irrelevant whether false testimony speaks to the defendant's guilt
or innocence or only to the witness's credibility-" 'a lie is a lie, no
matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the
133. See id. at 112.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
138. Id. at 214-15.
139. See id. at 215-16.
140. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
141. See id. at 265.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 272.
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[prosecution] has the responsibility and duty to correct what he
knows to be false and elicit the truth.' "144
These cases established that it is due process violation for the
prosecution to knowingly offer or permit perjured testimony to stand
at trial; 145 however, they never ruled explicitly on whether the prose-
cution's suppression of favorable evidence to the accused also violated
due process. The Court addressed this issue explicitly in Brady. In
Brady, the defendant challenged his first degree murder conviction
when he learned that the prosecution had suppressed his co-defen-
dant's extrajudicial admission that he had committed the actual kill-
ing.146 This evidence would have corroborated Brady's trial testimony
that he had participated in the crime but did not commit the actual
murder.1 47 Relying on Mooney, Pyles, and Napue the Court held that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."' 48 It then remanded the case for a retrial on
the issue of punishment. 149 This outcome, the Court noted, was not to
"punish[ ] ... society for misdeeds of a prosecutor[,]" but rather re-
quired by due process to avoid an "unfair trial to the accused."'150 The
Court reasoned that, where the prosecution withholds evidence that
would tend to exculpate the accused or reduce his penalty, the prose-
cution plays a critical role in shaping the defendant's trial-a trial that
will not comport with standards of justice unless all evidence material
to the defendant's guilt or innocence is presented to the jury.151
144. Id. at 269-70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854 (N.Y. 1956)).
145. These cases may also provide the basis for a due process claim in cases where it
can be proven that crime lab employees intentionally misrepresented information on the
witness stand and the prosecution knew of these misrepresentations. The focus of this
Comment, however, is the Brady claim that results when prosecutors willfully or inadver-
tently fail to turn information about problematic crime labs over to the defense.
146. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
147. See id. at 84-85.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id. The Court upheld the Maryland Court of Appeals decision that nothing in the
suppressed confession would have reduced the defendant's offense below first degree mur-
der, reasoning that questions of admissibility of evidence are reserved for the state courts.
See id. at 88-90. Therefore, the Court held it did not violate due process to limit the retrial
to the issue of punishment rather than guilt. See id. at 90-91.
150. Id. at 87.
151. See id. Subsequent to Brady, in a related series of cases, the Court considered
whether a due process violation occurs when police fail to preserve evidence favorable to
the accused. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. 51 (1984). The Court held that unless a defendant can show that the government's
failure to preserve the evidence was in "bad faith," no constitutional violation occurs. See
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B. The Three Prong Test for Brady Violations
Subsequent cases have clarified what a defendant must prove to
demonstrate a due process violation under Brady. First, the evidence
must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or
impeaching. 152 Second, the prosecution must have suppressed the evi-
dence, either willfully or inadvertently. 153 Third, the defense must be
prejudiced by the nondisclosure because the evidence was material to
the defense. 15 4 This section explains these three elements.
1. The Evidence is Favorable to the Accused
To prove a due process violation under Brady, the defense must
first demonstrate that the suppressed evidence is favorable to the ac-
cused. Evidence is favorable to the accused if it is either exculpatory
or impeaching.1 55 Exculpatory evidence suggests that the defendant
may not have committed the crime. 156 Evidence is impeaching if it
bears on the credibility of a significant witness in the case.
157
The suppressed evidence at issue in Brady, the confession of a co-
defendant, constituted a form of exculpatory evidence. 15 8 United States
v. Bagley15 9 clarified that impeachment evidence may also serve as the
basis for a due process claim under Brady. In Bagley, a federal district
court convicted the defendant on narcotics charges.1 60 After trial, the
defense learned that the prosecutor failed to disclose that the govern-
ment's witnesses were paid three hundred dollars for their testi-
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Moreover, the defendant must demonstrate that the evidence
"possess[ed] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed,
and be of such a nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means." Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. Because the standard to show a due
process violation in destruction of evidence cases is so high, Brady's disclosure duty pro-
vides a better way to address the injustice that results when defendants are convicted using
evidence from faulty crime labs.
152. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).
153. Id.
154. See id.; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
155. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 ("Impeachment evidence, ...
as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.").
156. See Black's Law Dictionary 251 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
157. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("When the 'reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence
affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule [of Brady]."); United States v. Brumel-
Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Evidence impeaching the testimony of a
government witness falls within the Brady rule when the reliability of the witness may be
determinative of a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence.").
158. See id. at 88.
159. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
160. Id. at 671.
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mony. 61 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's due process
rights may have been violated because the prosecution did not dis-
close that it had paid these key witnesses to testify. 162 The Court rea-
soned that knowledge of the government's inducements could have
been used to impeach the testimony of the witnesses on the basis of
bias or interest. 163 This evidence could have lead the jury to distrust
the witnesses' testimony, affecting the outcome of the case. 164 There-
fore the nondisclosure may have violated due process. 165 Knowledge
of problems at the HPD crime lab in some cases may have provided
exculpatory evidence to the defense and in all cases could have been
used to impeach the testimony of crime lab employees.
2. The Prosecution Willfully or Inadvertently Suppressed the
Evidence
The second prong of a Brady claim requires that the defense show
that the prosecution suppressed material evidence.1 66 To satisfy this
prong it is essential to consider what it means for the "prosecution" to
"suppress" evidence. This question has been litigated since Brady.
Brady noted that the prosecution's suppression of material evi-
dence violates due process regardless of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution. 167 Subsequent cases have demonstrated that Brady's
use of the term "suppress" is much broader than its usual connotation
suggests because it does not require active concealment of the evi-
dence. A Brady violation may occur even when the prosecution's fail-
ure to disclose the evidence is completely inadvertent. 168 The
prosecution's duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence arises
even when there has been no request by the accused. 169 Indeed, a
failure to disclose may result in a due process violation even when the
161. Id.
162. Id. at 682-84.
163. See id. at 683.
164. See id. at 676, 678, 683-84.
165. See id. at 683-84. While the Court recognized that the undisclosed evidence was
favorable to the accused within the meaning of Brady, it remanded the case to the court of
appeals for a determination of whether there was a reasonable probability that, had the
inducement offered by the government to the witnesses been disclosed, the result of the
trial would have been different-Brady's materiality prong. See id. For a discussion of
Brady's materiality prong, see infra Part II.B.3.
166. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
167. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
168. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282.
169. Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)).
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prosecutor possessed no personal knowledge of the exculpatory evi-
dence at the time of trial.170
This result derives in part from the Court's decision in Kyles v.
Whitley.171 In Kyles, the defense learned post-conviction of several
pieces of information that would have been favorable to its case.172
This undisclosed information included a description by an eyewitness
of the physical characteristics of the perpetrator that sounded more
like the government's informant than the defendant Kyles. 173 The
prosecutors also failed to disclose evidence that the police had impli-
cated the informant in another murder.1 74 They also did not tell the
defense that eyewitnesses had given statements that conflicted with
the prosecutor's story.175 The State argued that it should not be held
accountable for its failure to disclose this evidence because the police
did not inform the prosecutor of it until after trial.' 76 The Supreme
Court, however, held that prosecutors have "a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police."' 77 The Court reasoned that the
police's knowledge could be imputed to the prosecutor because poli-
cies and procedures could be established between the two offices to
ensure effective communication of all relevant information and
proper execution of the prosecutor's disclosure duties.1 78 It stated
that "any argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he
does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the
final arbiters of the government's obligation to insure fair trials."'1 79
The Court's ruling in Kyles makes clear that any knowledge that
the police have is imputed to the prosecutors themselves; further-
more, prosecutors have a duty to use due diligence to inquire as to
what information is in the police files.' 80 This idea was confirmed in
Strickler v. Greene.18' In Strickler, the Court considered a situation where
170. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
171. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
172. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422, 428-29.
173. See id. at 428.
174. See id. at 429.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 428.
177. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 438.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 437-38.
181. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
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despite the prosecution's "open file policy,"' 8 2 the defense learned
post-conviction of undisclosed documents in the hands of detectives
that would have impeached an eyewitness's trial testimony.1 83 The
Court held that the second Brady element was "unquestionably"
established. 1
84
The Court, moreover, rejected the State's argument that the post-
trial counsel had waived the defendant's Brady claim by failing to raise
it during state habeas corpus proceedings.1 85 The State based its argu-
ment on the fact that there were indications that the defense should
have known that the file was incomplete and therefore should have
made a new discovery request. 186 The Court, however, reasoned that
while it was likely that counsel both at trial and in post-trial proceed-
ings knew that the witness had been interviewed by the police multi-
ple times, it did not follow that they would know that records
pertaining to those interviews had been suppressed.18 7 The prosecu-
tor must have similarly known about these meetings, yet he did not
assert that his file was incomplete.1 88 Furthermore, when the evidence
is in the hands of the State, the defense cannot be expected to con-
duct the "'reasonable and diligent"' investigation required to pre-
clude a procedural default.189 Again, this decision puts the
responsibility in the hands of the prosecutor to learn of and disclose
exculpatory evidence possessed by the police. 190 As the Court reiter-
ated, "An inadvertent nondisclosure has the same impact on the fair-
ness of the proceedings as a deliberate concealment.' 9 This basic
principle seems to be the underlying force behind decisions like Kyles
182. Under an open file policy the prosecution presumably gives the defense access to
all the evidence in its files. See id. at 276. The Court noted that the prosecution's use of an
open file policy may increase the efficiency and fairness of the criminal process and that
when the prosecution asserts that it complies with Brady through an open file policy, de-
fense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials that the State is
constitutionally obligated to disclose. See id. at 283 n.23.
183. Id. at 273, 282-83.
184. Id. at 282.
185. See id. at 284-89.
186. See id. 283-85. The State argued, for example, that an examination of the witness's
trial testimony and a letter published in the local newspaper made it clear that the eyewit-
ness had been interviewed by detectives several times. See id. at 284.
187. See id. at 285.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 287-88 (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)).
190. Interpreting Strickler, the Court later noted, "Our decisions lend no support to the
notion that defendant must scavange for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the
prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed." Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S.
668, 695 (2004).
191. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 288.
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and Strickler, which enforce the link between the police and prosecu-
tion. 192 It would also apply where knowledge is in the hands of govern-
ment crime lab employees. 193
3. Prejudice Ensues Because the Suppressed Evidence Is Material
For the third prong of a Brady claim, the defense must show that
it has been prejudiced by the nondisclosure because the evidence was
material.194 The Court articulated the test for materiality in Bagley.' 95
Evidence is "material" if there is a "reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different.' 96 The Court defined "reasonable
probability" as a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the trial.' 97
To understand the parameters of this test, it is imperative to un-
derstand what the test is not. The Brady standard of materiality does
not require a demonstration that the suppressed evidence more likely
than not would have resulted in the defendant's acquittal. 198 Nor is it
a sufficiency of the evidence test; a Brady violation does not require
the defendant to show that after discounting the inculpatory evidence
in light of the undisclosed evidence there would not have been
192. Various circuit court cases provide instruction regarding the lengths to which
prosecutors must go to discharge their Brady duty of disclosure; they reinforce the idea that
prosecutors have a duty to find out what the police know and disclose that information to
the defense and provide instruction regarding the lengths prosecutors must go to dis-
charge their Brady duty of disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the U.S. Attorney's Office must review police department
files that may contain exculpatory information when the policewoman was the only witness
and her credibility was at issue); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970-71 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that the U.S. Attorney's Office had a duty under Brady to inquire into local
police office records in the Virgin Islands to determine whether its witness had a criminal
history); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that the U.S.
Attorney had a responsibility to inquire about the star witness's history as a drug dealer);
United States v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining that the prosecu-
tion had a duty to acquire and discipline officer's firearms worksheet, which would have
shown that the gun collected was inoperable); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th
Cir. 1964) (holding that police knowledge of ballistics reports and fingerprint tests that
tended to exculpate the defendant were imputed to the prosecution and should have been
disclosed to the defense).
193. See discussion infra Part III.B.
194. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282.
195. See generally United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
196. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
197. Id. In Bagley, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether there
was a reasonable probability that, had the inducement offered by the government been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 684.
198. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
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enough left to convict. 19 9 Rather, the test's focus is on whether, in the
absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant received a fair
trial-"a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. '" 20 0 This in-
quiry requires that the effect of the suppressed evidence on the trial
be considered collectively, not item by item.2 0 1 A court must consider
whether all "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict. '20 2 Finally, once a Bagley showing of materiality is made, a
constitutional error results and there is no further inquiry into
whether the error was harmless. 20 3 This standard of materiality makes
clear that not all failures by the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence will result in a constitutional violation. 20 4 The standard, how-
ever, raises the question of what impeachment evidence is material
enough to warrant a new trial. The Court examined the materiality
standard as applied to impeachment evidence in Strickler and, more
recently, in Banks v. Dretke.205
In Strickler, the Court found that the first two prongs of Brady were
satisfied because the prosecution had suppressed notes of police inter-
views with an eyewitness that would have cast serious doubt on signifi-
cant portions of the witness's trial testimony.20 6 The Court, however,
did not order a new trial.20 7 It came to this conclusion because the
record contained ample, independent evidence of the defendant's
199. Id. at 434-35.
200. Id. at 434.
201. Id. at 436-37. For instance, in Kyles the Court did not consider whether the incon-
sistent statements of eyewitnesses alone would have made a different result reasonably
probable. See 514 U.S. at 441-54. Rather, it considered whether confidence in the verdict
could be maintained in light of all the undisclosed evidence. See id. The Court held that
confidence that the verdict would have been unaffected cannot survive when sup-
pressed evidence would have entitled ajury to find that the eyewitnesses were not
consistent in describing the killer, that two out of the four eyewitnesses testifying
were unreliable, that the most damning physical evidence was subject to suspi-
cion, that the investigation it produced was insufficiently probing, and that the
principal police witness was insufficiently informed or candid.
Id. at 454.
202. Id. at 435.
203. Id. at 436.
204. See id. at 439. Indeed, this standard leaves the government with a degree of discre-
tion to decide whether exculpatory evidence must be disclosed and imposes upon the pros-
ecutor the corresponding burden to "gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and
make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached." Id. at 437. The
Court, however, seemed to encourage the "careful prosecutor" to err on the side of disclo-
sure. See id. at 339-440.
205. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
206. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282, 295 (1999).
207. See id. at 296.
(Vol. 39
KETA TAYLOR COLBY DEATH PENALTY PROJECT
guilt, as well as evidence sufficient to support the imposition of the
death penalty. 20 8 For example, even had the particular eyewitness's
testimony been discredited completely, the jury could still have con-
cluded that the defendant was the instigator and the leader in the
victim's abduction and murder because he was seen by another wit-
ness driving the car near the location of the murder.20 9 Moreover,
there was considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking
the defendant to the crime.210 Finally, the defendant's guilt of capital
murder did not depend on him being the dominant participant in the
crime, and the prosecutor did not rely upon the testimony at issue
during closing argument at the penalty phase.211 Considering these
factors, the Court was not convinced that the jury would have re-
turned a different verdict had the eyewitness's testimony been severely
impeached or excluded entirely by the suppressed evidence. 212
The Court came to a contrary conclusion in Banks.213 In Banks,
the defendant, convicted by ajury of capital murder and sentenced to
death, learned post-conviction that the prosecution's key witness dur-
ing both the guilt and punishment phases of his trial was a paid police
informant named Farr, who assisted in setting up his arrest.21 4 Farr's
testimony was especially critical in the penalty phase because he was
one of two witnesses who testified that Banks possessed a propensity
toward violence-a finding necessary for the jury to impose the death
penalty.2 1 5 On cross-examination, Farr falsely denied that he was the
person who had told police about Banks's trip to Dallas.21 6 During
closing argument for the sentencing, however, the prosecutor argued
that Farr, who had been truthful with the jury about his own drug use,
had also been honest to the jury in all other regards. Therefore, Farr's
testimony demonstrated that Banks was "'a danger to friends and
strangers, alike."' 21 7 In its consideration of the materiality of Farr's
informant status to Bank's sentence, the Court noted that because
208. Id. at 290.
209. See id. at 290-91.
210. Id. at 293.
211. Id. at 292.
212. Id. at 296.
213. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
214. See id. at 674-75, 678-80.
215. See id. at 679-80. Indeed, Banks had no criminal record, nor a history of violence
or alcohol abuse that would indicate a particular risk of future violence. Id. at 699 n.17.
216. See id. at 680. The police apprehended Banks on his way to Dallas with Farr to
retrieve the murder weapon. See id. at 676, 678.
217. Id. at 681 (quoting the prosecutor's closing statement at the penalty phase of
Banks's trial).
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Banks had no criminal record, Farr's testimony about Banks's propen-
sity to commit violent acts was crucial to the prosecution. 218 The Court
reasoned that, unlike the eyewitness's testimony in Strickler which was
mainly cumulative, Farr's testimony was "the centerpiece" of the pros-
ecution's penalty phase case. 219 Considering that Banks's defense did
not have the opportunity to thoroughly probe the highly suspect testi-
mony of an informant, the Court held it could not be confident that
Banks received a fair trial on the issue of punishment.220
While Strickler and Banks do not provide definitive guidelines for
determining whether evidence is material to the defense, they suggest
that to satisfy the third prong of Brady courts must consider whether
the non-disclosed evidence was cumulative and the importance of the
unimpeached testimony to the case as a whole. Where crime lab evi-
dence is central to a defendant's conviction, it is likely that evidence
calling into question the propriety of that evidence would be consid-
ered "material."
HI. When the State's Failure to Disclose the Problems at the
HPD Crime Lab Constitutes a Due Process Violation
Defendants who have been unfairly convicted based on evidence
analyzed at problematic crime labs are often left without a remedy. In
Houston, the fact that State prosecutors did not disclose the problems
at the lab to the defense implicates due process rights under Brady. To
provide a concrete example of how Brady applies, this section demon-
strates how the three prongs of Brady can be met in the context of the
HPD crime lab. This application of Brady, however, is valid for any
case from any government-run crime lab nationwide in which the
prosecutor did not disclose evidence of problems at the lab to the
defense team before trial and the crime lab evidence was material to
the defendant's conviction.
A. Evidence of Problems at the HPD Crime Lab Such As Poor
Storage of Evidence and Mismanagement Constitute
Impeachment Evidence
The first prong of Brady requires that the evidence the prosecu-
tion failed to disclose was either exculpatory or impeaching. 221 Like
218. Id. at 700.
219. Id. at 701.
220. See id.
221. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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the payments made to the witnesses in Bagley, disclosure of the
problems at the HPD crime lab would have provided defendants with
valuable impeachment evidence at trial.222
Take for example the fact that Police Chief Bradford allowed the
problems at the HPD crime lab, such as the leaky roof that caused the
destruction or contamination of evidence, to fester. This was powerful
information that could have been used to impeach the testimony of
lab employees by challenging the reliability of test results from the
lab. Had the prosecution disclosed this information to defense coun-
sel, the defendant could have queried on cross-examination whether
analysts could be absolutely certain in light of a problem of this mag-
nitude that any particular sample had not been contaminated. The
fact that 280 boxes of mislabeled evidence from 8,000 cases were
found could similarly be used to question the trustworthiness of data
from the lab. Indeed, because this sort of mislabeling suggests disor-
ganization of a larger scale at the HPD crime lab, the information
could be used to question whether evidence in any particular case had
been handled and labeled properly.
Defense lawyers also could have used information about the defi-
cient educational qualifications and lack of clear standards and over-
sight at the lab to undermine the credibility of forensic scientists from
the HPD crime lab, who served as the State's key witnesses in many
trials. For example, when jurors wrongly convicted Josiah Sutton of
rape, the jury convicted him based on the testimony of Christy Kim, a
DNA analyst for the HPD who testified that Sutton's DNA matched
that of the semen found in the rape victim. 2 23 Police investigators
cited Kim for incorrectly documenting the results of DNA profiles,
failing to report the full use of DNA results, and making an incorrect
data entry in a capital murder case. 224 Information such as Kim's his-
tory of errors and her lack of a background in statistics would have
222. In some cases, the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence of problems at the
HPD crime lab may have also been favorable to the accused because it was exculpatory. For
example, in the case of Nanon Williams, the fact the fatal bullet actually came from a gun
of the same caliber of Williams's co-defendant would have suggested that Williams did not
commit the crime, or at least that he did not shoot the fatal bullet. See discussion supra
notes 79-84 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, because general evidence of problems
at the HPD crime lab could have been used to impeach witnesses in all cases where evi-
dence tested at the lab was presented, impeachment evidence is the focus of this section.
Williams's defense attorneys could have impeached Baldwin's testimony by bringing out on
cross-examination that he never tested the co-defendant's gun-by failing to test the co-
defendant's gun, the co-defendant could not be ruled out as the shooter.
223. See Khanna & McVicker, Police Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab, supra note 27.
224. Id.
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been valuable impeachment material for any trial at which she testi-
fied. On cross-examination and in argument, her lack of qualifications
and past mistakes could have been used to suggest to the jury that her
results in that particular case were not reliable. Similarly, in any case
in which Bolding testified, especially in cases where he testified re-
garding the results of tests conducted by subordinates in the DNA di-
vision, the evidence of his lack of oversight could be used to challenge
the trustworthiness of his testimony.
Likewise, information about Robert Baldwin's past errors and
questionable methodologies could have been used to impeach his tes-
timony in cases where ballistics tests were at issue. For example, in
Bernal's case defense attorneys could have questioned Baldwin about
his need to shoot the gun twenty-five times and clean it with solvent
before he obtained a "match." Defense attorneys could have argued to
the jury that this questionable methodology substantially undermined
the validity of Baldwin's testimony that the fatal bullet came from
Bernal's gun.
Evidence of a pattern of misrepresentations would also have
called the testimony of crime lab employees into serious doubt. There-
fore, any evidence that a crime lab employee had testified in an incon-
sistent way in a previous case should have been disclosed to defense
attorneys; the contradictory past testimony could be used to challenge
the truthfulness of the employee's current conclusions.
Any information related to the mismanagement of the lab, in-
cluding the poor storage of evidence, that lab employees were not
properly qualified to perform the testing, and the general lack of over-
sight at the lab, is favorable to the accused and essential to conducting a
proper cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. A defendant who
did not have the opportunity to impeach prosecution witnesses using
this information and who was convicted on the basis of the crime lab
evidence may have been denied due process of law.
B. Employees of the HPD Crime Lab Are Part of the Prosecution
Team, Therefore Their Knowledge of Problems at the
Lab Is Imputed to Harris County Prosecutors
To meet the second prong of Brady the defendant must show that
the prosecution suppressed evidence. 225 To meet this prong it is im-
portant to determine which persons compose the prosecution team;
the answer determines what evidence should have been turned over to
225. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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the defense. Any information favorable to the accused in the hands of
HPD crime lab employees will be imputed to the prosecutor, because
HPD crime lab employees, as part of a government-run police opera-
tion, will be considered part of the prosecution team under Kyles. The
information in police files in the Kyles case is similar to information
that HPD crime lab employees knew because, in both instances, the
police possessed the information that would have impeached key pros-
ecution witnesses yet did not disclose it to the defense.
The California Supreme Court case In re Brown226 also supports
the view that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the mismanagement
and history of errors at the HPD crime lab constitutes suppression by
the prosecution under Brady. John Brown was convicted of first degree
murder of a police officer and sentenced to death.227 After his convic-
tion, Brown sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecu-
tion committed a Brady error by failing to disclose the result of a crime
lab test, which indicated that he had tested positive for PCP.228 The
court vacated the conviction and remanded it for reconsideration of
the petitioner's capacity to premeditate and deliberate, reasoning
that, under Kyles, the test result was material evidence that would have
helped the defense's theory of diminished capacity.229 Further, the
court noted that "the lab 'worked closely with the District Attorney's
Office in assisting it in the prosecution of cases'; and there is no seri-
ous dispute that in these circumstances, [the crime lab] was part of
the investigative 'team."' 230 The court went on to state that "[t]he
prosecutor thus had the obligation to determine if the lab's files con-
tained any exculpatory evidence . . . and disclose it to the [defen-
dant]."231 Brown, therefore, stands for the proposition that
government-run crime labs are part of the prosecution team and, con-
sequently, the individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge
of all information in their possession.
Like the evidence of drug test results suppressed by crime lab em-
ployees in Brown, the case of Jorge Villanueva provides an example of
how the suppression of favorable evidence by HPD crime lab employ-
ees would constitute suppression by the prosecution. Villanueva was
convicted of the murder of an elderly neighbor and sentenced to
226. 952 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1998).
227. Id. at 716-17.
228. Id. at 717.
229. See id. at 726-27.
230. Id. at 719 (quoting Frank Fitzpatrick, the chief criminalist responsible for manage-
ment of the lab clerical staff at the time of Brown's case).
231. Id.
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death. 232 At Villanueva's trial an HPD crime lab employee testified
that pubic hairs found at the scene matched Villanueva's. 233 What the
lab employee did not tell the jury or disclose to the defense was that
he had only tested one of up to seven genetic regions on the hair that
could have been tested and that the limited identification offered by
this test would have matched 136,000 people in Harris County.234 Nor
did the lab employee reveal that he only reported statistics for the
race of the suspect himself-while the tests performed on a hair may
be consistent with only one in 100,000 Hispanics, they may also be
consistent with one in twenty blacks.235 Failure to disclose the limita-
tions of the testing performed made it appear to the jury that Vil-
lanueva was the only likely murderer. 236 Similarly, the lab analysts
stated that there was blood on Villanueva's shoe. 237 They did not, how-
ever, disclose to the defense that the substance found on the suspect's
shoe could just as likely have been organic fertilizer, fungicide, or
bleach. 238 Finally, crime lab employees did not disclose to the defense
that they had failed to test two other pubic hairs found at the crime
scene, which matched neither Villanueva nor the victim. 23 9 This was
all information favorable to Villanueva that was known by crime lab
employees. Under Kyles and Brown this knowledge was imputed to
Harris County prosecutors. Thus, the failure to disclose the favorable
evidence constituted a suppression by the prosecution sufficient to sat-
isfy Brady's second prong.
The HPD crime lab is an arm of the prosecution team and there-
fore any information it knows is imputed to the prosecution. Like the
contradictory witness statements in Kyles and Strickler, the poor han-
dling of evidence and error rates of the employees at the HPD crime
lab would have impeached the credibility of crime lab evidence
presented at hundreds of criminal trials in Harris County. Moreover,
it is irrelevant under Brady law whether the defense specifically re-
quested information regarding the integrity of testing at the HPD
crime lab, or even whether the crime lab's failure to disclose the
232. McVicker & Khanna, Case Gets 2nd Look After Lab Missteps; DNA Work, Police Tactics
in Question, Hous. CHRON., May 4, 2003, at Al [hereinafter McVicker & Khanna, Case Gets
Second Look].
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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problems was purposeful or inadvertent.240 Rather, the mere fact that
errors and problems at the HPD crime lab were concealed from de-
fense attorneys is sufficient to constitute suppression-what matters is
that in light of the lab's problems many defendants' trials may have
been unfair.
C. The Suppression of Problems at the Lab Is Prejudicial When
Evidence Tested at the HPD Crime Lab Played a Key
Role in the Conviction or Sentencing of a
Defendant
The final prong of Brady requires a showing that the prosecu-
tion's failure to disclose favorable evidence prejudiced the defense be-
cause it was "material."241 This is the biggest obstacle to defendants
who seek a due process remedy under Brady because they were con-
victed using HPD crime lab data. Under Bagley, to demonstrate mate-
riality, individuals who were convicted based on physical evidence and
testimony of analysts from the HPD crime lab must show that, had the
lab's problems been disclosed to the defense, there would have been a
reasonable probability of a different result.242 The reason this is the
most difficult prong to meet in the situation of a questionable crime
lab is that the failure to disclose information regarding the general
problems at the HPD crime lab must have materially affected the way
that a particular individual was tried. It must be shown that the jury
might have changed its decision to convict if it had known about the
history of lab errors and mismanagement.
Nevertheless, the materiality prong can be met for those cases in
which evidence analyzed at problematic government crime labs was
critical to the defendant's conviction. As Kyles instructed, when judg-
ing materiality a court must consider the collective effect of all of the
problems at the crime lab on the conviction, rather than each prob-
lem individually. In light of the Court's holdings in Strickler and Banks
this is most likely to be true in situations where (1) the crime lab data
was the only evidence linking the defendant to a crime 243 or (2)
where the suppressed evidence about the errors would have provided
the only basis for impeachment of a key government witness. 244 In
these situations evidence of problems at the crime lab is material-
240. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
241. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
242. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
243. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
244. See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 457-58 (2d Cir. 1991).
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without the undisclosed impeachment evidence, the prosecution's
case against the defendant goes untested. This undermines the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.
Case law supports the proposition that prejudice can be shown
where the evidence that should have been impeached supplied the
only proof linking a defendant to the crime. In Giglio v. United States245
the defendant was charged with forgery and only one witness linked
the defendant to the crime.246 Prosecutors had promised the witness,
who was also a co-conspirator, that they would not try him if he would
testify against the defendant. The prosecution did not disclose this
leniency to the defense. 247 The Supreme Court found this to be mate-
rial enough to warrant a new trial because the witness's testimony was
the only evidence implicating the defendant. 248
To compare the facts in Giglio with the HPD crime lab, in situa-
tions where the physical evidence analyzed at the lab was the sole evi-
dence linking the defendant to the crime, it is essential evidence. The
fact that its credibility could be impeached makes it factually similar to
Giglio. Thus, a due process violation occurs when a defendant does
not have the opportunity to cross-examine and impeach the crime lab
witness.
Materiality can also be shown where the undisclosed matter
would provide the only basis for impeachment. 249 If nothing else is
impeaching the testimony of a key witness, and the prosecution with-
holds the only evidence that would have impeached the witness, then
it is material enough to create a due process challenge. 250
In the HPD crime lab cases the evidence about each criminalist's
prior errors and lack of academic qualifications was not disclosed to
the defense. Jurors in Harris County did not know that the lab was so
245. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
246. Id. at 150-51.
247. Id. at 151-52.
248. Id. at 154.
249. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457-58. In Wallach, the government's key witness perjured
himself, yet the government did not correct his testimony. Id. at 457. The Court of Appeals
reversed the defendant's conviction because that witness was "the centerpiece of the gov-
ernment's case." The court reasoned that had his lying been brought to the attention of
the jury, his entire testimony would have been discounted and the jury would have acquit-
ted the defendants. Id. at 457-58.
250. Id. See also United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 278 (2d. Cir. 1975), in which the
court found that when suppressed evidence only additionally impeaches a witness whose
credibility has already been shown to be questionable, it is not material enough to warrant
a new trial. As stated in Wallach, however, when the suppressed evidence is the only im-
peaching evidence, then it provides a basis for a new trial. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457-58.
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severely mismanaged when they convicted defendants in hundreds of
cases in which crime lab evidence played an important role in the
juries' verdicts. In cases where the prosecution did not turn over any
information about the manner in which the criminalist tested the
physical evidence, the prosecution may have violated the Brady man-
date. For example, consider a case where there are no eye witnesses
and no weapon is recovered, yet an HPD crime lab employee testifies
in a way that links the physical evidence of the crime to the accused.
The jury returns a guilty verdict. Here, the crime lab evidence must
have played a major role in the jury's formulation of its guilty ver-
dict-it was the only evidence upon which the jury could convict the
defendant. Thus, if the prosecution suppressed information that
would question the integrity of the crime lab, it would likely be consid-
ered material.
Several of the cases discussed in this Comment also demonstrate
how the failure to disclose problems at the HPD crime lab may have
materially affected the outcome of the case. For example, in the case
of Josiah Sutton, other than the testimony of an eyewitness whose rec-
ollection was faulty, the only evidence linking him to the crime was
the testimony of crime lab employees that Sutton's DNA pattern
matched that in the rape kit.25 1 Had Sutton's attorneys known about
the problems at the lab, and in particular the inadequate skills and
training of the lab employees, they could have challenged the accu-
racy of the test results presented at Sutton's trial. During cross-exami-
nation, for instance, the crime lab witnesses could have been
questioned thoroughly about whether they could be certain about the
results of this particular test in light of their history of past mistakes
and the possibility of contamination. This sort of cross-examination
might have so undermined the reliability of the crime lab evidence in
the jury's eyes that they would have returned a verdict of not guilty.
Had the DNA sample used to convict Sutton not been preserved prop-
erly for retesting, the Brady claim presented here would have been
critical to ensure that he received a new trial where the crime lab evi-
dence could be fully tested.
Had the crime lab evidence presented at the trial of Jorge Vil-
lanueva been similarly challenged, the outcome of his trial might have
also been different. Villanueva's trial differed slightly from Sutton's
because at that trial the prosecution also possessed evidence that Vil-
lanueva had confessed to the murder.25 2 Villanueva, however, re-
251. See discussion supra notes 61-78.
252. See McVicker & Khanna, Case Gets Second Look, supra note 232.
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tracted the confession, stating that he confessed only after being
struck in the mouth by a homicide detective-he pointed to a missing
tooth as evidence that this was true.253 Had Villanueva's attorneys
been able to question the crime lab evidence used against him by
pointing out the lab's frequent use of selective testing and manipula-
tion of statistics, 254 Villanueva's story might have appeared more be-
lievable to the jury.
Furthermore, evidence of the questionable methodologies used
by the ballistics section of the HPD crime lab and the lab's failure to
test the co-defendant's gun may have materially affected the jury's de-
cision to impose the death penalty upon Nanon Williams. At the sen-
tencing stage in Texas, jurors are instructed to consider whether the
defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or was merely an
accomplice with no intent to kill.255 Had Williams's attorneys been
aware of the problems in the ballistics section, they could have at least
raised a doubt in the jurors' minds whether Williams shot the fatal
bullet and perhaps convinced them to spare his life.
When crime lab evidence played an important role in the case,
prosecutors who used evidence from the HPD crime lab had a duty to
disclose any and all problems to the defense team prior to trial. Be-
cause Houston's district attorney failed to do so, those defendants are
entitled to new trials where they will receive what due process re-
quires-a full and fair opportunity to challenge the prosecution's
case. Under a Brady analysis all three prongs are met, therefore this
remedy is available. First, the HPD crime lab's history of mistakes is
information favorable to the defense because it qualifies as impeach-
ment material; second, the prosecution is responsible for the suppres-
sion of the evidence because the evidence was in the possession of the
police crime lab; third, it is material to the defense because if juries
knew of the conditions of the HPD crime lab there is a reasonable
probability that their verdicts would be different. This argument can
apply to any case across the country where the prosecution fails to
disclose to the defense a history of errors at a state-run crime lab and
where evidence from that lab played a crucial role in convicting a
defendant.
253. Id.
254. See discussion supra notes 232-39.
255. SeeTEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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Conclusion
In jurisdictions where police departments are responsible for test-
ing physical evidence, prosecutors have a duty under Brady and its
progeny to disclose crime lab deficiencies to the defense. The prose-
cution team's effective performance of this duty ensures that criminal
defendants receive fair trials. Disclosure of a government-run crime
lab's problems is favorable impeachment evidence that may materially
affect the outcome of an accused's trial.
Unfortunately, many people accused of crimes have already had
their freedom taken away because a jury convicted them based on
physical evidence analyzed at problematic labs. As shown in this Com-
ment, these defendants have a Brady claim. Under Brady they are enti-
tled to new trials-fair trials-where the crime lab evidence used
against them may be fully tested using the information that was previ-
ously suppressed by the prosecution. The Due Process Clause of
United States Constitution, and the fundamental principle of justice
which it seeks to protect, demand nothing less. As stated in Brady, "the
principle.., is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of a prose-
cutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."25 6 It is time for
the many defendants convicted with evidence from faulty crime labs
to receive the justice to which they are entitled. Brady provides the
solution.
256. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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